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ABSTRACT 
Does the Lack of Trade Matter? 
The Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem. 
(April 2002) 
Cynthia Lynn Rose 
Department of Economics 
Texas A&M University 
Fellows Advisor: Dr. William S. Neilson 
Department of Economics 
This paper studies the implications of the endowment effect on the Coase Theorem. The 
endowment effect places a sharp bend or kink in the traditional indifference curve. 
Applying this result to the traditional two-party exchange model using Edgeworth box 
analysis identifies and explains the large no-trade zone found in the endowment effect 
literature. The Edgeworth endowment model explicitly shows that the endowment effect 
does not result in an inefficient volume of trade as previously thought. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper has four goals. First, I explain the Coase Theorem and the endowment 
effect. Second, I explore the endowment effect's influence on the traditional indifference 
curve. Third, using Edgeworth boxes, I present a two-party exchange model in the 
absence of the endowment effect. Finally, I explore the implications of the endowment 
effect on the two-party exchange model. Please note that in this paper, as in most 
writings on the Coase Theorem and the endowment effect, I use the criterion of Pareto 
efficiency — an allocation of resources in which no person's surplus can increase 
without decreasing another' s. 
The Coase Theorem: Definition 
In 1960, Nobel Laureate Ronald Coase published "The Problem of Social Cost, " in 
which he criticized the current approach among economists of the "Pigovian Tradition" 
to the problem of market failure. This article challenged the legal and economic 
professions' approach to problems regarding market failure and the legal implications 
thereof. The Coase Theorem, which states that with insignificant transaction costs, 
resources will be allocated efficiently regardless of the initial assignment of property 
rights, started a revolution of thought in the economic profession in the areas of 
transaction costs and exchange theory. I use the railroad-and-farmer example made 
famous by Coase in "The Problem of Social Cost" (1960) to illustrate his theorem. 
In this example, a railroad runs adjacent to a farmer's field. Occasionally sparks 
fly from the trains and burn the farmer's crops. The farmer, having suffered loss of 
' This thesis follows the style and format suggested by the American Psychological Association. 
income from the inadvertent burning of his crops, pursues a lawsuit for damages against 
the railroad owner. The severity of crop damage positively correlates with the number of 
trains run per day and, consequently, the judge hearing this case would have to issue the 
right to determine the number of trains run per day to either the farmer or the railroad 
owner. Traditionally, approaching the problem from an efficiency perspective, 
economists would have assigned this property right to the party incurring external costs 
(i. e. , the farmer incurring the cost of lost income due to the railroad owner's actions). 
This conclusion seems logical at first because it seems fair. However, Coase pointed out 
that assigning the property right to the railroad owner would result in the same final 
allocation as assigning property right to the farmer, and he pointed out that this outcome 
would be efficient as well. 
At first glance, one may think that assigning the property right to one party 
would result in the holder of the property right operating with no regard to the 
preferences of the other party. This logic led economists to think that assigning the 
property right to the injured party would rectify the externality. In fact, if this were true, 
then assigning the property right to the injured party might well only serve to reverse the 
externality. Rather than operating with no regard to the other party, both parties would 
actually exchange entitlements exactly until the marginal profit from the exchange 
declines to zero, provided insignificant transaction costs. If the railroad owner obtained 
the right to determine the number of trains run per day, then the farmer would have 
incentives to pay the railroad owner to decrease the number of trains run per day. 
Alternatively, assigning the property right to the farmer would encourage the railroad 
owner to compensate the farmer for lost profits in exchange for the right to increase the 
number of trains run per day. In either case, the party purchasing additional rights will 
do so until the cost paid exceeds the benefit received. Such payments alter the division 
of welfare between parties, but leave the total social welfare unchanged. 
The Coase Theorem has both proponents and opponents. Cooter (1989) holds 
that the range of market failure is too large to be encompassed by a theory of transaction 
costs as Coase asserts. He also asserts that government (the courts in this example) 
should serve to lubricate the exchange process rather than issue commands to the parties. 
The assignment of property rights by the courts, however, lubricates the exchange 
situations that have ended up on the court's dockets. Coase's suggestion that efficiency 
and causality are not linked does contradict the precedents in many court cases just as 
Cooter points out. This fact is not surprising, because economists, not the court system, 
are charged with identifying increasingly reliable means of understanding and 
lubricating the exchange process. It is not surprising then that the Coase Theorem has 
caused a larger stir in the field of economics than in the field of law. 
Usher (1998) asserts that the Coase Theorem argues that the existence of costless 
exchange will allocate resources etTiciently in the absence vf property righis. Coase did 
not argue this point although his phrasing may not have excluded this logical 
interpretation. The evolution of the Coase Theorem in economics has clearly emphasized 
that property rights are necessary for efficient exchange, but that the assignment of those 
rights among the involved parties has no bearing on the outcome as long as transaction 
costs remain insignificant. 
Defending Coase's methodology, Posner (1993, p. 210) argues that, "we need not 
accept Coase's methodological prescription in order to understand that it has served him 
well and in serving him well has served the economics profession — and allied 
disciplines, such as law — very well indeed. " The Coase Theorem has met with 
skepticism in the literature because Coase relied on simple arithmetic modeling even 
though the field of economics has turned to more advanced mathematical and statistical 
models. However, we should not brush the Coase Theorem off as overly simple when 
faced with challenging data such as that presented in the endowment effect literature. 
After all, Posner recalls Whitehead's aphorism that, "It requires a very unusual mind to 
undertake the analysis of the obvious (p. 205). " 
The Endowment Effect: Definition 
Research conducted on the endowment effect has challenged the Coase 
Theorem's validity. The literature on the endowment effect states that when people are 
endowed with a good, they demand a much higher amount to sell it than they would pay 
to acquire it (Thaler, 1980; Thaler, 1992; Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 2000; Jolls, 
Sunstein, and Thaler, 2000). In 1990, two experiments run by Kahneman, Knetsch, and 
Thaler showed strong endowment effects (Kahneman, et al. , 2000). Specifically, their 
experiments revealed that sellers demand roughly double the price that buyers are 
willing to pay. The consequent lack of trade observed by these researchers seems 
inefficient because it falls below the levels observed in the control markets. 
The Endowment Effect: Possible Causes 
Though the presence of the endowment effect is obvious in the research, its 
causes are not at all obvious. Propositions offered in the literature to explain the 
endowment effect include I) the concept of loss aversion and the status quo bias borne 
out of the literature on framing and reference-dependent decision-making, 2) the concept 
of imprecise preferences and the belief that, over time, education and experience will 
correct the endowment effect, and 3) the concept of updating. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) present the theory of reference-dependent 
decision-making. Loss aversion means that people prefer present endowments to 
switching bundles because such a switch involves a loss of the present endowment. In a 
1991 publication, they show that reference point effects lead to allocations not predicted 
by the Coase Theorem. Samuelson and Zeckhauser's (1998) decision-making 
experiments overwhelmingly show people sticking with the status quo; the authors apply 
their results to the areas of periodic decision-making, search, soft selling, sticky prices, 
exit barriers, market competition, public policy, and scientific advancement. Brookshire 
and Coursey (1987) find that the magnitude of the loss-aversion phenomenon varies 
depending on whether the setting is market or non-market. They also find that the market 
acts as a disciplinarian of loss-aversion behavior. Jolls, et al. , (2000) recommend that 
further research be conducted to formulate a better model than neoclassical economics 
provides so that prediction and the formation of policy may be improved. 
Harbaugh, Krause, and Vesterland (2001) conduct a study on the existence of 
imprecise preferences based on the assumption that if people did exhibit an endowment 
effect due to imprecise preferences, then education and experience over time should 
correct or decrease the magnitude of the endowment effect. Their results support the 
theory of reference-dependent preferences and do not show a decrease in the endowment 
effect through experience measured by age. 
Lastly, and I believe as yet untouched in the literature, is the possibility that once 
endowed with a good, people update their use for that good and, simultaneously, their 
value of it. Further research on this possibility may help to narrow in on the cause or 
causes of the endowment effect. 
The Endowment Effect Applied to the Coase Theorem 
Examining the Coase Theorem in light of the endowment effect using the 
example of the farmer and the railroad owner, it seems logical that when the judge 
endows a party with the right to determine the number of trains run per day, that party 
would value the right more upon endowment. In this case, the party holding thc property 
right would assign a value to the possession of that right. Therefore, any payment 
accepted from the farmer to induce the railroad owner to decrease the number of trains 
run per day would have to include compensation for the loss of the absolute property 
right. Therefore, in the presence of the endowment effect, the payment required to 
induce the railroad owner to forgo the running of each train would be higher than in the 
absence of the endowment effect. 
This paper develops a new model that accounts for the endowment effect while 
sustaining the Coase Theorem. It addresses four questions. First, in the absence of the 
endowment effect, does the final allocation of resources depend on initial ownership? 
Second, in the presence of the endowment effect, does final allocation of resources 
depend on initial ownership? Third, in the presence of the endowment effect, does 
efficiency depend on initial ownership? Finally, does the exhibition of the endowment 
effect by only one party change the answers to the preceding three questions? 
THE MODEL 
The Endowment Effect and Traditional Indifference Curves 
Willingness to accept (WTA) refers to the amount of money a person will require 
to sell a good that he or she possesses while willingness to pay (WTP) refers to the 
amount of money a person will pay to acquire a good. Experiments by Kahneman, et al. , 
(2000) demonstrate that the endowment effect increases a person's WTA but does not 
change that person's WTP. ' The inequality of WTA and WTP is referred to in the 
literature as the WTA-WTP disparity. Morrison (1997) explores the effect of the WTA- 
WTP disparity on the traditional indifference curve in detail. She explores the possible 
complimentarity of substitution effects and the endowment effect in causing the WTA- 
WTP disparity. She finds that the endowment effect does exist, and in Morrison (1998), 
presents the results of an earlier paper as a defense of Knetsch's conclusion that the 
endowment effect is a major cause of the WTA-WTP disparity. Dubourg, Jones-Lee, and 
Loomes (1994) find a significant and persistent WTA-WTP disparity in their 
experiments; in over half of their usable cases, the WTA and WTP intervals do not 
overlap. 
' These expenments were run irr 1990 aad are explored heavily ia Thaler (1992). 
With the understanding that the endowment effect increases a person's marginal 
willingness to accept (MWTA) but does not affect the marginal willingness to pay 
(MWTP), I now examine the change in the traditional indifference curve (IC) caused by 
the endowment effect and illustrate the change in Figure 1. 
[PLACE FIGURE 1 HERE] 
IC. , represents a person's indifference curve in the absence of the endowment effect. The 
marginal willingness to accept on IC, (MWTA, ) is defined as the marginal rate of 
substitution between good x and dollars at point A on IC, when moving to the northwest. 
The MWTA, is the amount of money a person would be willing to accept in the absence 
of the endowment effect to sell a unit of good x. The marginal willingness to pay on IC„ 
(MWTP, ) is defined as the marginal rate of substitution between good x and dollars at 
point A on IC, when moving to the southeast. The MWTP, is the amount of money a 
person would be willing to pay in the absence of the endowment effect for an additional 
unit of good x. As the endowment effect shows, when endowed with Qi of good x, 
MWTA, will increase while MWTP. , remains the same. The rotation of IC, about the 
endowment point A to a steeper curve (ICs) will accomplish the necessary alteration of 
the traditional indifference curve. At point A, 
(I) MWTAs & MWTA„ 
and more importantly, 
(2) MWTAs & MWTP, . 
The traditional indifference curve (IC, ) is smooth at point A because MWTA, is equal to 
MWTP, . The fact that these are no longer equal yields a relevanr combination curve— 
an indifference curve kinked at point A consisting of the IC, to the southeast of A and 
ICs to the northwest of A. 
An Edgeworth Analysis 
In the Absence of the Endowment Effect 
In the absence of the endowment effect, an Edgeworth box illustrates a two-party 
exchange model that adheres to the Coase Theorem. 
[PLACE FIGURE 2 HERE] 
As Figure 2 illustrates, at a point, such as point A, above the contract curve in Region A, 
person I is on ICi and person 2 is on ICt. At this point, person I's marginal willingness 
to pay (MWTPi) is greater than person 2's marginal willingness to accept (MWTAt). 
Consequently, person I will buy units of good x from person 2 and both parties will 
continue this process until MWTP i equals MWTA&. They will agree on a final 
allocation, like point C on the contract curve, where MWTPi equals MWTAt (i. e. , ICi 
and ICt are tangent). The contract curveis the set of all the points at which the two 
parties ' indifference curves reach tangency; all contracts on the contract curve are 
Pareto efficien. Therefore, according to this model, in the absence of transaction costs, 
only bundles of goods that lie on the contract curve will not be exchanged in a trade for 
another bundle; every bundle not located on the contract curve will accompany 
subsequent trade. In Region B, the situation is exactly the reverse of that in Region A. 
Looking at this in another way, in Figure 2, MWTAi = MWTPi and MWTAt = 
MWTP& at every endowment point. Table I shows the possibilities or regions in the 
absence of the endowment effect. 
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[PLACE TABLE I HERE] 
In addition, in the absence of the endovnnent effect, the final allocation does not 
depend on the initial division of goods. If the initial division of goods is point A, then it 
is probable that the final allocation, point C, would be the same as if the initial division 
of goods was point B. This result is probable but not absolute; the outcome could 
depend on the initial allocation of property rights. To date, no conclusive research exists 
on a method to determine the final allocation with the knowledge of the initial division 
of goods. Research in this area would expand our understanding of exchange theory. The 
possibility that the final allocation could depend on the initial division of goods does not 
contradict the Coase Theorem because Coase did not assert invariance of the final 
allocation regardless of the initial allocation of property rights. 
1n the Presence of the Endotvntent Effect 
In applying the new relevant combination curves (RCC) to the Edgeworth box, 
the manifestation of the endowment effect becomes apparent. According to the 
relationship of person I's MWTA to person 2's MWTP and vice versa, the RCC defines 
three regions and a dual-contract curve rather than the traditional two regions and 
contract curve. 
[PLACE FIGURE 3 HERE] 
Figure 3 shows that at point A, which corresponds to point A in Figure 2, 
(3) MWTAi & MWTPn 
In the area above the dual-contract curve (Region A), person I will purchase additional 
units of good x from person 2 as is the case in Figure 2. For endowment point B, all the 
characteristics of the curves and the direction of trade are reversed. Trade will occur as 
person I sells some or all of good x to person 2 because 
(4) MWTAi & MWTPt 
in Region B. 
[PLACE FIGURE 4 HERE] 
Figure 4 shows that at point U, a point on the upper bound of the dual-contract curve, 
(5) MWTAi = MWTPi. 
Trade will not occur at an endowment on the upper bound of the dual-contract curve 
because the WTA area of RCCq is tangent to the WTP area of RCC i and the WTA area 
of RCC~ and the WTP area of RCCq are not tangent but do converge at a single point. 
For endowment point L, all the characteristics of the curves are reversed. On the lower 
bound of the dual-contract curve, 
(6) MWTAi —  MWTP. . 
Trade will not occur because the WTA area of RCC i is tangent to the WTP area of RCCq 
and the WTA area of RCCq and the WTP area of RCCi are not tangent but do converge 
at a single point. The upper and lower bounds of this no-trade zone define the dual- 
contract curve. 
The area inside the no-trade zone (Region I) has different characteristics from 
that inside Regions A and B. 
[PLACE FIGURE 5 HERE] 
Figure 5 shows that at point I, in Region I, 
(7) MWTAq & MWTPi and 
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(8) MWTAi & MWTPr. 
Trade does not occur in Region I because neither person is willing to pay more than the 
other person is willing to accept to gain another unit of good x. The kinked indifference 
curves of person I and 2 intersect at a single point and allow no room for trade. The 
WTA part of RCCz and the WTP part of RCC i are not tangent but do converge at one 
point; the WTA part of RCC i and the WTP part of RCCi are not tangent but do converge 
at a single point. 
Looking at this in another way, in Figures 3, 4 and 5, MWTAi & MWTPi and 
MWTAz & MWTPz at every endowment point. Table 2 shows the possibilities or regions 
in the presence of the endowment effect. 
[PLACE TABLE 2 HERE] 
Note that even if only one party exhibits the endowment effect, the previous 
results will still hold in the face of minor alterations to the marginal conditions because 
either MWTAi and MWTPi or MWTAz and MWTPi will be equal. 
The dual-contract curve and the area inside of it comprise an expanded region of 
no trade when compared to the exchange model in the absence of the endowment effect. 
In the absence of the endowment effect, Region I does not exist and the upper and lower 
bounds of the no-trade zone coincide to form a single contract curve. Consequently, the 
presence of the endowment effect decreases trade. However, any allocation on or inside 
the no-trade zone is a Pareto efficient Walrasian equilibrium. Consequently, the decrease 
in trade does not correspond to a decrease in efficiency. 
In the presence of the endowment effect, the final allocation apparently depends 
on the point of the initial division of goods. If the initial division of goods is above the 
dual-contract curve, then the final allocation on the upper bound or inside the dual- 
contract curve should be different than if the initial division of goods were below the 
dual-contract curve. This result is not absolute, however. The possibility that initial 
allocations above and below the dual-contract curve could result in the same final 
allocation somewhere inside the no-trade zone can not be ruled out since a reliable 
model to determine the final allocation given the initial endowment does not exist. 
The Model and the Casse Theorem 
When applied to Coase, the endowment effect does not contradict his theorem, 
which states that when there are no transaction costs, efficiency occurs no matter who is 
endowed with the good. Although the final allocation depends on which party holds the 
property right in the presence of the endowment effect, any allocation of property rights 
will result in a Pareto efficient outcome on or inside the dual-contract curve. This 
outcome corresponds to the model in the absence of the endowment effect because the 
final allocation on the dual-contract curve is efficient no matter who is endowed with the 
property right. In both the model with the endowment effect and without, efficiency 
occurs, no matter who is endowed with the property right. 
The Model and the Evidence 
The new model's prediction of decreased trade in the presence of the endowment 
effect is supported by Kahneman, et al. , (2000). In their first experiment, students at 
Cornell University were given tokens and told the amounts at which they valued them. 
Assigning values for the students provided a control for the demand and supply curves. 
When the market opened for trade, these induced value markets performed exactly as 
applied microeconomic theory predicted; The optimal level of trade occurred and each 
token worked its way to the highest-valued user. The control markets correspond to the 
exchange model in the absence of the endowment effect. In the second experiment, half 
of the students were given coffee mugs and told the bookstore list price. All participants 
completed a questionnaire designed to elicit the demand and supply curves of the buyers 
and sellers respectively. Surprisingly, trade volume fell far below that predicted; Sellers 
demanded roughly double the price that buyers were willing to pay. The experimental 
markets correspond to the new model in the presence of the endowment effect. 
The Model and Transaction Costs 
Both the traditional model and the model in the presence of the endowment effect 
assumed no transaction costs. The assumption of transaction costs would introduce to the 
traditional model a no-trade band surrounding the contract curve, as Figure 6 illustrates. 
[PLACE FIGURE 6 HERE] 
This band appears because the gains from trade in this region are less than the 
transaction costs. In the exchange model with transaction costs, all points not on the 
contract curve are inefficient. The presence of transaction costs simply means that the 
final allocation is more likely to be inefficient than in the absence of transaction costs. 
The new model also assumes no transaction costs which would introduce two no-hade 
bands to the new model — one above and one below the upper and lower bounds of the 
dual-contract curve respectively, as Figure 7 illustrates. 
[PLACE FIGURE 7 HERE] 
In this case, all points not on the bounds or inside of the dual-contract curve are 
inefficient. In this model, the presence of transaction costs simply means that the final 
allocation is more likely to be inefficient than in the absence of transaction costs. 
However, the final allocation is more likely to be efficient in the new model than in the 
traditional model when transaction costs are present in both because the new model has a 
larger number of efficient points of allocation than the traditional model (i. e. , the no- 
trade region is larger). 
CONCLUSIONS 
The new model exhibits a much larger region of no trade than the model without 
the endowment effect. By applying the relevant combination curve to the two-party 
exchange model, the new model explains the results obtained by Kahneman, et al. , 
(2000). In the presence of the endowment effect, the dual-contract curve encloses a 
larger no-trade region than the single contract curve in the absence of the endowment 
effect. Therefore, less trade occurs. In addition, the new model explicitly shows that 
every point inside the region of no trade bounded by the dual-contract curve is Pareto 
efficient. The lack of trade observed in the endowment effect literature only seems 
inefficient when compared to a Coase situation because a larger volume of trade would 
be expected. However, the new model puts the efficiency implications of the endowment 
effect to rest because it shows that final allocations satisfy the criterion of Pareto 
efficiency in the presence of the endowment effect. The lack of trade does not 
16 
demonstrate negative effects on efficiency. In fact, the lack of trade does not matter 
because the final allocation is still Pareto efficient. Therefore, the Coase Theorem holds 
even in the presence of the endowment effect, which simply increases the probability of 
variance in the outcome depending on which party is assigned the property right. This 
conclusion has not been discussed explicitly in the literature to date. 
17 
Table 1 Regions of the Traditional Model 
Region Marginal condition Direction of trade 
MWTPi & MWTAs 1 buys from 2 
Contract Curve MWTA~ = MWTPI — MWTAt = MWTPa No trade 
MWTAI & MWTPp 2 buys from 1 
Table 2 Regions of the New Model 
Region Marginal Condition Dtrectton of trade 
A MWTA) & MWTPt & MWTAp & MWTPp 
MWTAI & MWTPs and MWTAq & MWTPi 
Upper Bound MWTA~ & MWTPI = MWTAs & MWTPs 
1 buys from 2 
No trade 
No trade 
Lower Bound MWTAs & MWTPq = MWTA~ & MWTP~ No trade 
MWTAp & MWTPp & MWTAI & MWTP) 2 buys from 1 
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